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Abstract
This Comment will review the recent history of evidentiary standards in expatriation proceed-
ings. The Comment will also analyze the views espoused by the Supreme Court in the Terrazas
opinion regarding the use of the preponderance standard in light of constitutional limitations on
congressional power and the standard’s effectiveness in preventing forcible denationalization. Fi-
nally, the propriety of the alternative clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence standard will be
briefly examined.
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE:
AN INEFFECTIVE BURDEN OF PROOF IN
EXPATRIATION PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Vance v. Terrazas' the Supreme Court evaluated the pro-
tections afforded an individual's rights in expatriation proceedings.
2
The then-existing protections were held inadequate to prevent un-
1. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, rehearing denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980). Laurence J.
Terrazas was a dual national by virtue of his birth in Maryland to an American mother and a
Mexican father. Terrazas' dual citizenship was consistent with United States law. See, e.g.,
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). In 1971, while a student in Mexico at Colegio Comercial
Ingles, Terrazas was advised that in order to be graduated he had to file a Certificate of
Mexican Nationality. He obtained the certificate but later found out that other identification
would have sufficed.
The Certificate of Mexican Nationality read in part: "I therefore hereby expressly
renounce citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience, and loyalty to
any foreign government, especially to that of , of which I might have been
subject ... " Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 255 n.2 (original in Spanish). The blanks were
later filled in with the words Estados Unidos and Norteamerica respectively. Id. at 9.
Terrazas subsequently testified that by signing the Certificate of Mexican Nationality he
neither thought nor intended to renounce United States citizenship. 577 F.2d 7, 9 (7th Cir.
1978).
After he obtained the certificate Terrazas was informally notified by a United States
State Department employee that the certificate may have affected his status as a United
States citizen. Terrazas was then informed that he had expatriated himself by signing the
Certificate of Mexican Nationality. He sued the Secretary of State to reinstate his citizenship.
The district court held that he had committed an expatriating act as set forth by Congress in
sec. 349(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) (1976). See note 4 infra. The court of appeals found the statute
applied by the district court unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals decision, affirming the result reached by the district court on different grounds. The
Terrazas case is discussed in Note, 21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 527 (1980); Note, Vance v. Terrazas:
The Standard of Proof in Expatriation Proceedings, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 427 (1980).
2. Expatriation proceedings initiated by the government threaten persons with the loss
of nationality, a constitutional right, and its attendant rights and privileges. See Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), and note 29 infra and accompanying text. Prior to Terrazas, the
only protections afforded citizens faced with expatriation were the procedural provisions of
the INA. See note 17 infra. Essentially, anyone found committing one of the expatriating acts
listed in the INA could lose citizenship if it were shown that he or she had performed the
expatriating act voluntarily. No intent to expatriate had to be shown under the provisions of
the INA. See note 4 infra for a list of expatriating acts. See note 32 infra, for a discussion of
voluntariness and intent.
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constitutional, forcible denationalization. 3  The Court formulated
the act plus intent test which requires the government to show that
a citizen voluntarily performed a congressionally-designated expa-
triating act 4 and the person's intent' to surrender citizenship in
order to establish a loss of nationality.
The Terrazas act plus intent test strongly reaffirmed a prior
Court holding6 that Congress lacks the power to forcibly expatriate
3. Historically there has been considerable debate over whether Congress has the power
to take away citizenship. See Gray, Expatriation-A Concept in Need of Clarification, 8 U.
CAL. D. L. REv. 375 (1975). The exercise of that power is not the direct concern of this paper
except as it relates to congressional power over the burden of proof in expatriation proceed-
ings. Currently, the government may initiate expatriation proceedings subject to the constitu-
tional limitations over the exercise of congressional power. See notes 25-36, 49-56 infra and
accompanying text. The following definitions will clarify the concepts discussed throughout
this paper. Expatriation refers to a loss of nationality by a person born or naturalized a
citizen in the United States. Denationalization as used herein will also refer to any loss of
nationality by a person born or naturalized a citizen in the United States. It has been
proposed that these terms be distinguished so that denationalization denotes a government-
initiated loss of citizenship and expatriation refers to the loss of nationality initiated by the
citizen. See Expatriation-A Concept in Need of Clarification, supra at 388. Denaturaliza-
tion refers to an annulment of citizenship. In denaturalization proceedings the government
claims that the person never had citizenship because it was improperly granted. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451 (1976). Several types of United States citizenship exist. They differ in the manner in
which the person acquires nationality. This Comment focuses on fourteenth amendment
citizenship; that acquired by persons born or naturalized citizens within the United States.
4. The expatriating acts under the 1952 version of the INA and their current status are
as follows: naturalizing in a foreign state; taking an oath of allegiance to another state;
serving in another nation's armed forces without permission of the State Department; holding
a government post in another state; voting in a foreign election (held an unconstitutional
restriction on citizenship in Afroyim v. Rusk, discussed in note 6 infra); formally renouncing
United States citizenship to a diplomatic officer of the United States when outside the United
States; making a formal written renunciation to the United States government when within
the United States; deserting from the United States armed forces in time of war (repealed
1978 by Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978)); committing an act of treason; leaving
the United States during time of war for the purpose of avoiding military service (repealed
1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 501(a), 90 Stat. 1258 (1976)). Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 349, 66 Stat. 267 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1)-(9) (1976)).
The performance of an expatriating act was the only criterion prior to Terrazas. Although
Congress lacks the power to place conditions upon citizenship, it does determine what
conduct will constitute an expatriating act. See generally notes 28-36 infra and accompany-
ing text. Procedures for expatriation proceedings apply to any party claiming the loss of
nationality, but the government is usually the party initiating the expatriation action and
thus usually bears the burden of persuasion. See note 17 infra. Consequently, in this Com-
ment the procedural sections of the INA will be said to apply to the government. Sometimes
the citizen rather than the government initiates the action. See, e.g., United States v.
Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (Government
sought taxes from person claiming previous expatriation).
5. 444 U.S. at 263. See note 32 infra for a discussion of intent.
6. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). See notes 25-36 infra and accompanying text.
The term "act plus intent test" is used in this Comment to denote the current requirements
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citizens and improved protections for fourteenth amendment citi-
zenship.' Despite the addition of the substantive act plus intent
test, the Court left intact the procedural schema for expatriation
proceedings enacted by Congress, 8 including the use of the prepon-
derance standard of proof.9 This Comment examines the possibil-
ity that by upholding the preponderance standard the Court may
have negated beneficial protections provided by the act plus intent
test and may have allowed unconstitutional forcible expatriation to
continue. 10
This Comment will review the recent history of evidentiary
standards in expatriation proceedings. The Comment will also ana-
lyze the views espoused by the Supreme Court in the Terrazas
opinion regarding the use of the preponderance standard in light of
constitutional limitations on congressional power and the stand-
ard's effectiveness in preventing forcible denationalization. Finally,
the propriety of the alternative clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence standard will be briefly examined.
II. RECENT HISTORY OF THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
IN EXPATRIATION PROCEEDINGS
A. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard of
Nishikawa v. Dulles
The 1952 version of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) provided for the denationalization of any citizen committing
an expatriating act." At that time Congress was considered to
have the power to forcibly denationalize citizens under its foreign
for loss of nationality in government-initiated expatriation proceedings. The act requirement
of the test refers to the expatriating acts listed in the INA. See note 4 supra. The intent
requirement of the test refers to the intent requirement mandated by the Court in Terrazas.
See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
7. The Terrazas intent requirement is the first affirmative step taken by the Court to
provide protection for fourteenth amendment citizenship and represents broad-reaching
protection for such citizenship. Previous attempts to protect citizenship were limited, nega-
tive sanctions on specific government action. See notes 25-36 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976). See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
9. The preponderance standard requires the trier of fact to find that the " 'existence of
the fact is more probable than its non-existence.' " J. PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EvIDENCE, § 97
(10th ed. 1973) quoting MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 24 (1962 ed.).
10. See notes 69-72 infra and accompanying text.
11. See note 4 supra.
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affairs power.12  The INA did not specify an evidentiary standard
to be used in denationalization proceedings.
The standard then used in denaturalization proceedings was
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. 13  In 1958 the Su-
preme Court's Nishikawa v. Dulles decision found that clear, con-
vincing and unequivocal evidence was also appropriate for dena-
tionalization cases. 14  In concluding that the clear and convincing
standard was applicable to all loss of citizenship actions, the Court
found no reason for imposing a lighter burden on the government
merely because it seeks to show the expatriation of a native-born
citizen. ' 5
B. Congress Enacts the Preponderance Standard
In 1961 Congress examined the evidentiary standards used in
expatriation proceedings and found the preponderance standard
appropriate.' 6 Congress amended the INA to include a specific
procedural section for use in expatriation proceedings.1 7 The legis-
lative history of this amendment discloses that Congress began
investigating the evidentiary standard seeking to expedite the dena-
tionalization of persons then avoiding that result in administrative
hearings.' 8 To facilitate denationalization Congress lowered the
12. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (dena-
tionalization of person voting in a foreign election upheld as part of government's inherent
power to regulate foreign affairs).
13. See also Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955); Knauer v. United States, 328
U.S. 654 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
14. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958) (expatriation of United States citizen of
Japanese descent serving in Japanese armed forces).
15. Id. at 133-38.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L.
87-301, § 19, 75 Stat. 656). See H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th CONG., 1st Sess., reprinted in
[1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2950.
17. The relevant part of the INA states:
Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any action or
proceeding commenced on or after September 26, 1961 under, or by virtue of, the
provisions of this chapter or any other Act, the burden shall be upon the person or
party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such claim by a preponderence
of the evidence. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, any
person who commits or performs, or who has committed or performed, any act of
expatriation under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act shall be presumed
to have done so voluntarily, but such presumption may be rebutted upon a showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the act or acts committed or performed
were not done voluntarily. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th CONG., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2950, 2984.
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burden of proof from the clear, convincing and unequivocal stand-
ard established in Nishikawa to the preponderance standard.'0
The procedures detailed by Congress state that the government
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that an expatriating
act was committed.20 Upon such a showing the government bene-
fits from the presumption that the act was performed voluntarily. 2'
The statute permits citizens to rebut the presumption of voluntari-
ness by posing an alternative explanation for the conduct.22 The
alternative explanation must similarly be established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.23 Under this congressional scheme if the
presumption were rebutted, then the proceedings would end; if
not, then the citizen could be denationalized.2 4
C. Afroyim v. Rusk: A Redefinition of the Extent of
Congressional Power Over Expatriation
Afroyim v. Rusk, 5 although a landmark case in expatriation
law, did not specifically address congressional power over the evi-
dentiary standard. Afroyim focused on the scope of congressional
power over expatriation proceedings. 26 Afroyim was a dual na-
tional who voted in an Israeli election and was subsequently denied
renewal of his American passport because such a vote was an
expatriating act under the INA.2 7 Afroyim challenged the ability
of Congress to place conditions upon his citizenship.21 After exam-
ining the powers of Congress under the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court found that citizenship granted under the amend-
ment was unconditional; Congress lacked the power to forcibly
denationalize a citizen.29 Speaking for the majority, Justice Black
said, "the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, pro-
tect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible
destruction of his citizenship. . . and gives this citizen. . . a consti-
19. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976).






25. 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (5-4 decision).
26. See note 32 infra.
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1976).
28. 387 U.S. at 254.
29. Id. at 267.
124 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:119
tutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he volun-
tarily relinquishes that citizenship."' 30
However clearly Justice Black stated the limitations placed
upon congressional power, the protection of citizenship mandated
by Afroyim never came to fruition. 31  After Afroyim the concept of
voluntariness 32 within the INA was exploited to sustain the viability
30. Id. at 268 (emphasis added). Justice Black was criticized for his reading of the
history and purpose of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Harlan, dissenting, accused Justice
Black of expanding the intent and effect of the fourteenth amendment beyond its definitional
character in regard to citizenship. Justice Harlan claimed that the only purposes of the
fourteenth amendment in regard to citizenship were to specify who were citizens, overturn
the Dred Scott decision and establish the superiority of federal citizenship over state citizen-
ship. See, Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1856). Justice Harlan declared that the fourteenth
amendment was not an instrument limiting congressional power to denationalize unwilling
citizens. Id. at 268-93 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See note 108 infra.
31. Insomuch as the government could easily bring denationalization proceedings after
Afroyim the protections mandated could be termed ineffective. Afroyim, however, could
provide the basis for limiting Congressional power. See notes 90-95 infra and accompanying
text.
32. The Afroyim Court created confusion through its use of the concepts of "voluntari-
ness," "assent" and "intent." Under the INA the only assessment of the purpose of the
individual concerns the voluntariness of the conduct. Voluntariness thus did not mean the
same thing as the person's intent to relinquish citizenship. See Revedin v. Acheson, 194 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1952) cert. denied 344 U.S. 820 (1952); Rosasco v. Brownell, 163 F. Supp. 45
(E.D.N.Y. 1958). Instead, the voluntary commission of an expatriating act was considered to
embody assent to a loss of nationality because the conduct was fundamentally inconsistent
with United States citizenship. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting). Afroyim made expatriation depend upon the person's assent. See, 387 U.S. at
257. "[A]cademic commentary" maintained that Afroyim
imposed the requirement of intent to relinquish citizenship on a party seeking to
establish expatriation. See Comment, An Expatriation Enigma: Afroyim v. Rusk,
48 B.U. L. REv. 295, 298 (1968); Note, Acquisition of Foreign Citizenship: The
Limits of Afroyim v. Rusk, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 624, 624-625 (1969); The Supreme
Court: 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 126 (1967); Note, 29 OHIO ST. L. J. 797,
801 (1968).
444 U.S. at 262 n.6. The interpretation of the term assent, though, vitiated the effectiveness
of the requirement. According to the Attorney General, conduct could still establish expatria-
tion because it embodied the assent required by Afroyim. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397, 400 (1969).
Justice Harlan dissenting in Afroyim presaged the practical ineffectiveness of the intent
requirement:
[The majority] has assumed that voluntariness is here a term of fixed meaning; in
fact, of course, it has been employed to describe both a specific intent to renounce
citizenship, and the uncoerced commission of an act conclusively deemed by law to
be a relinquishment of citizenship. Until the Court indicates with greater precision
what it means by "assent," today's opinion will surely cause still greater confusion in
this area of the law.
387 U.S. at 269 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Terrazas Court finally indicated with "greater precision" exactly what assent in
Afroyim embodied. The Court held that assent meant the person's intent to relinquish
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of the proceedings based merely upon conduct. The Attorney Gen-
eral asserted that voluntary relinquishment of citizenship was not
confined to written declarations; citizenship could be renounced
through conduct. 33  Afroyim thus did not affect the validity of the
INA except insofar as it concerned voting in foreign elections. 34 The
factfinder's inquiry after Afroyim was the same as it had been
before; it was concerned with whether the expatriating act had
been committed willingly rather than whether the citizen intended
such an act to signify rejection of American nationality.
Afroyim, however, did affect the procedural aspects of expa-
triation proceedings. 35  Despite the INA's mandate for the use of
the preponderance standard, many courts after Afroyim employed
the clear, convincing and unequivocal standard, citing the Afroyim
decision as a limitation upon congressional power over the eviden-
tiary standard. 36
citizenship which was not conclusively indicated by the voluntary commission of an expatri-
ating act. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text.
33. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 400 (1969).
34. The effect of Afroyim has been summarized as follows:
Afroyim thus represents the culmination of the past ambiguity in expatriation law
and the source of its present confusion. On the one hand it appeared to settle the
basic issue of congressional power to expatriate by directly overruling Perez. On the
other it generated the more practical question of what constitutes "voluntary renun-
ciation." Moreover, the very narrowness of the margin of decision gave rise to
doubts as to its real impact. A change in the Court's composition could easily lead to
still another reversal in its position. Meanwhile, the Attorney General's interpreta-
tion, in an attempt to simplify the burden on those who had to administer the law,
struck a middle ground between the polar extremes of Perez and Afroyim.
Expatriation-A Concept in Need of Clarification, supra note 3, at 382.
35. See, e.g., Jolley v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971).
36. By enacting § 349(c) of the INA in 1961 Congress clearly specified that the prepon-
derance standard should be used in all loss of nationality actions, see note 17 supra, but clear
and convincing evidence has been employed repeatedly since. In Berenyi v. District Director,
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 630 (1967), the Supreme Court declared
that "[w]hen the Government seeks to strip a person of citizenship already acquired . . . it
carries the heavy burden of proving its case by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evi-
dence.' " Id. at 636. The Second Circuit in United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.
1976) held that a mere oath of allegiance to another nation would not result in expatriation
unless there was clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence of specific intent to renounce
United States citizenship. A three judge court in Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp.
1035 (D.D.C. 1972) also employed the clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence standard
in a post-Afroyim expatriation case.
In a pre-Afroyim case, the Supreme Court held, 5-4, that some expatriation proceedings
undef the INA were distinctly penal in character and thus were subject to the procedural
safeguards of the fifth and sixth amendments. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963).
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III. THE TERRAZAS DECISION
Laurence J. Terrazas, a national of both the United States and
Mexico from birth, signed a Certificate of Mexican Nationality in
order to receive a degree. 37  The United States State Department
told Terrazas that he had expatriated himself by signing that certif-
icate.3 8  The State Department contended that the certificate
plainly effected express renunciation of non-Mexican nationality
and constituted an expatriating act under the INA. 39  Terrazas
denied that he had intended to affect his American citizenship by
signing the certificate.40 Terrazas sued to overturn the State De-
partment's determination. The district court found that Terrazas
had indeed committed an expatriating act and upheld his loss of
United States citizenship. 41
A. The Circuit Court's Consideration of Vance v. Terrazas
The court of appeals reviewed the district court's decision and
stated that the record fully supported the denationalization of Ter-
razas because he had voluntarily committed an expatriating act. 42
The court, though, remanded the decision to the district court
because the preponderance standard was inappropriate for loss of
nationality actions .4
The court attacked the statutory preponderance standard con-
tending that it exceeded the limitations placed upon congressional
power in Afroyim. 44 Judge Sprecher perceived that the ability to
retain citizenship is a function of the burden of proof. 45  He deter-
mined that because the evidentiary standard was tantamount to the
37. Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7, 7 (7th Cir. 1978).
38. 577 F.2d at 8. See note 1 supra.
39. Id.
40. 577 F.2d at 9. The State Department confronted the problem of persons seeking to
avoid the draft many times'during the sixties and seventies. See, e.g., Note, Formal Renunci-
ation of United States Citizenship to Avoid Criminal Liability Under Selective Service Law
Constitutes a Voluntary Relinquishment of Nationality Within the Meaning of Afroyim v.
Rusk, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1532 (1971). The official in charge of the Terrazas case expressed
doubts that Terrazas' conduct was motivated by a desire to avoid the draft. 577 F.2d at 9 n.6.
41. Terrazas v. Vance, No. 75-2370 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1979) (memorandum opinion).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id. at 10.
45. Id. Indeed, Judge Sprecher cited the legislative history of the INA amendment
which lowered the burden of proof to a preponderance of the evidence. H.R. REP. No. 1086,
87th CONG., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1961) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2950, 2984.
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power to forcibly denationalize citizens Congress lacked power over
the burden of proof. 46  The court proclaimed that the Constitution
mandated the use of the clear, convincing and unequivocal evi-
dence standard in expatriation proceedings after it had considered
the value of United States citizenship and other post-Afroyim deci-
sions. 47
B. The Supreme Court's Consideration of Terrazas:
The Act Plus Intent Test and the Preponderance Standard
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' finding that
Terrazas may not have expatriated himself. 48  In finding that Ter-
razas was properly stripped of his citizenship the Court confronted
the concept of voluntariness. 49  The Court realized that certain
persons, although not truly intending to expatriate, were nonethe-
less subject to forcible destruction of their citizenship because they
had engaged in congressionally-defined expatriating conduct.5 0
Seeking to prevent such unconstitutional denationalization, the
Court held that "expatriation depends on the will of the citizen
rather than on the will of Congress and its assessment of his con-
duct." 5 '
The INA was not found unconstitutional; rather, the acts listed
therein were held insufficient to establish a loss of nationality.5 2 In
addition, the Court mandated that intent to expatriate be demon-
strated before expatriation can result.5 3  The act plus intent test
46. 577 F.2d at 10.
47. Id. at 12.
48. 444 U.S. at 270.
49. Id. at 261. See that portion of Justice Harlan's dissent discussed in note 30 supra.
50. Id. at 261-62.
51. Id. at 260. All facts considered, the approach to Terrazas advocated by Mr. Justice
Brennan in his dissenting opinion seems the most logical. He stated:
Appellee was born a dual national. He is a citizen of the United States because he
was born here and a citizen of Mexico because his father was Mexican. The only
expatriating act of which appellee stands accused is having sworn an oath of
allegiance to Mexico. If dual citizenship, per se, can be consistent with United States
citizenship, Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939), then I cannot see why an oath
of allegiance to the other country of which one is already a citizen should create
inconsistency. One owes allegiance to any country of which one is a citizen, espe-
cially when one is living in that country. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717,
733-35 (1952). The formal oath adds nothing to the existing foreign citizenship and,
therefore, cannot affect his United States citizenship.
444 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
52. 444 U.S. at 261.
53. Id.
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provides a specific standard by which to measure the constitutional-
ity of government-initiated expatriation proceedings.5 4  The test
affords considerable protection for citizenship and individual
rights. 55
Addressing the evidentiary standard issue, Mr. Justice White
stated that the Supreme Court was "in fundamental disagreement"
with the circuit court's proposition that the proper burden of proof
for expatriation proceedings was clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence.56 The Court noted that it had implemented the clear,
convincing and unequivocal evidence standard in Nishikawa, but
dismissed the current viability of Nishikawa and deferred to the
congressional purpose behind the 1961 amendment to the INA, to
reinstate the preponderance standard .
7
The Court then addressed the circuit court's contention that
the preponderance standard contravened "the spirit, if not the
logic," of Afroyim.5 8  The Court argued that if the Afroyim Court
had wished to limit congressional power over the evidentiary stand-
ard, then it would have addressed the issue.59  The Court reasoned
that because the Afroyim Court had not discussed the evidentiary
standard, it could not have intended to limit congressional power.60
The Court did not address the circuit court's observation that
ability to retain citizenship during expatriation proceedings was a
function of the evidentiary standard.61 Instead, the Court dis-
cussed the general powers of Congress over the federal courts and
over the implementation of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
54. The Terrazas Court left no ambiguity concerning the new intent requirement. The
Court carefully pointed out that the assent of the individual as used by Chief Justice Warren
in his Perez dissent was too limited for use under the INA and that actual intent must be
demonstrated separately from the performance of acts listed in the INA. 444 U.S. at 260-61.
55. See generally, Expatriation-A Concept in Need oj Clarification, supra note 3, at
375-380.
56. 444 U.S. at 264. Seven members of the Court supported the portion of the decision
regarding the intent requirement, but only five agreed with the part concerning the prepon-
derance standard.
57. Id. at 265.
58. 577 F.2d at 10. See notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text.
59. 444 U.S. at 265. See note 69 infra.
60. id.
61. 577 F.2d at 10. The Court did aver to the power of Congress to establish the
evidentiary standard. This resort to the propriety of congressional power led Mr. Justice
Marshall to chastise the majority for its "casual dismissal" of the value of American citizen-
ship which could not "withstand scrutiny." 444 U.S. at 271 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also note 69 infra.
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noted that because "Congress has the express power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is untenable to hold that it has no
power whatsoever to address itself to the manner or means by
which Fourteenth Amendment citizenship may be relinquished. ' 12
The Court briefly considered possible limitations on congres-
sional power under the citizenship clause and the due process
clause. 3  The Court conceded that the due process clause man-
dated higher evidentiary standards than preponderance in certain
situations, such as criminal and involuntary commitment proceed-
ings. 4 Despite its previous statements regarding the importance of
citizenship, the Court found that citizenship was insufficiently im-
portant to warrant strict evidentiary protections.65 The Court also
declared that the preponderance standard was appropriate for ex-
patriation proceedings because they "are civil in nature and do not
threaten a loss of liberty."66 Reaching back to earlier arguments in
Terrazas, Mr. Justice White concluded that the act plus intent test
represented a heavy burden and therefore the congressionally-
approved preponderance standard should not be disturbed.6 7
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF THE PREPONDERANCE
STANDARD: ITS FUNCTION WITHIN THE
ACT PLUS INTENT TEST AND
PROTECTIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP
As Circuit Court Judge Sprecher perceived, a thorough anal-
ysis of the evidentiary standard in expatriation proceedings is vital
to assure the effectiveness of the substantive protections afforded
citizenship."8 The Court did not provide such an analysis in Terra-
62. 444 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). It is equally untenable to hold that Congress has
absolute power. See note 61 supra; see note 69 infra and accompanying text.
63. 444 U.S. at 266.
64. id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis added). The civil nature of expatriation proceedings does not neces-
sarily dictate the use of the preponderance standard. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979). Moreover, some types of expatriation proceedings have been described by the Su-
preme Court as having a distinct "penal character." See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963). The majority's statement that expatriation proceedings do not threaten a loss
of liberty also seems inappropriate. See note 69 infra and accompanying text. The dissenters
in Terrazas complained that the majority's concept of liberty was tantamount to mere lack of
physical confinement. 444 U.S. at 271 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Id. at 273 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. 444 U.S. at 267.
68. See 577 F.2d at 10. If intent to expatriate cannot clearly be established, then the
protections provided by the Court in Terrazas will have no value.
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zas. Instead, the Court set forth a series of defensive arguments
calculated to meet points proposed by the circuit court. 69
The Court's position in support of the lower evidentiary stand-
ard was especially disturbing because it stood in stark contrast to
the concern expressed for protecting citizenship earlier in the Terra-
zas opinion.7 0  Although the Court declared that the intent require-
ment was a heavy burden, 7' it failed to acknowledge that the
weight of the burden would depend entirely upon the strictness of
the evidentiary demands made upon the government. 72
A. Congressional Power over the Burden of Proof in
Expatriation Proceedings
One reason the Terrazas Court was reluctant to disturb the
preponderance standard was the congressional preference for that
standard expressed in the INA. 73 The Court found that congressio-
nal power over the burden of proof came from power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment.74  The Court's mere reference to congres-
sional power is unpersuasive. As Mr. Justice Marshall noted in his
dissent, finding the grant of congressional power "is the beginning,
not the end, of the inquiry. 7
The importance of the preponderance standard arises from
two sources: first, the burden of proof in expatriation proceedings
69. The Court's argument was particularly unpersuasive at times. See note 66 supra for
a discussion of the Court's statement that expatriation proceedings warrant the preponder-
ance standard because they are "civil in nature" and do not threaten a loss of liberty.
Additionally, the Court's reliance upon silence in Afroyim concerning the burden of proof is
unsatisfying because the evidentiary standard was not an issue before the Afoyim Court. See
notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text. Also, deference to congressional preferences seems
inappropriate because the INA deliberations took place in Congress at a time when it was
empowered to forcibly denationalize citizens through merely specifying expatriating con-
duct. It is unlikely that now, alerted to the lack of general congressional power to denational-
ize citizens and to the value of American citizenship, representatives would decide the issue of
the burden of proof in expatriation proceedings the same as in 1961. Due to significant
changes in the law concerning the scope of congressional power and the need to show intent
to expatriate, the Court should not have relied upon the obviously outdated congressional
findings.
70. See 444 U.S. at 260 ("[E]xpatriation depends upon the will of the citizen rather than
on the will of Congress and its assessment of his conduct").
71. 444 U.S. at 267.
72. See notes 79-89 infra and accompanying text.
73. 444 U.S. at 266-67. See note 69 supra.
74. 444 U.S. at 266.
75. 444 U.S. at 271 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See note 69
supra.
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may support or defeat the effectiveness of the substantive protec-
tions afforded citizenship by Terrazas;76 second, the burden of
proof reflects the value of citizenship to society in expatriation
proceedings.77 Congress controls this critical aspect of expatriation
proceedings; by lowering or raising the burden of proof Congress
can make it easier or harder to keep nationality. The circuit court
reasoned that because congressional control over the evidentiary
standard affects citizenship and thus exceeds the Afroyim limita-
tions, the burden of proof should be determined by constitutional
requirements without regard to the congressional enactment. 78
B. In Its Practical Application the Preponderance Standard Likely
Does Not Prevent Unconstitutional Denationalization
The preponderance standard, used within the act plus intent
test, will not likely prevent the unconstitutional, forcible denation-
alization of non-assenting citizens. 79  Despite the Supreme Court's
statement that after the requirements of the INA have been satisfied
the "question remains whether ...the expatriating act was per-
formed with the necessary intent to relinquish citizenship," in
many instances the question, in all likelihood, will have already
been answered.8O
In approving the preponderance standard, the Court did con-
cede that intent would not be an independent evidentiary issue. 81
Evidence of the expatriating conduct can be "highly persuasive" on
the issue of intent.82  In some cases, the new intent requirement
may be satisfied by the same evidence which established expatria-
tion under the old voluntary relinquishment standard. 83
76. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
77. The value of citizenship is also eroded by intent determined by a bare preponder-
ance because the "standard of proof ultimately 'reflects the value society' places on the
interest at stake." 444 U.S. at 272 quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. 577 F.2d at 10. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
79. Id.; see also note 32 supra.
80. 444 U.S. at 270. Even though the Court mandated an additional test, the intent
requirement, the actual proof needed may not have changed in some cases. Thus, the actual
testimonial and physical evidence proffered in cases after Terrazas to establish the expatriat-
ing conduct might very well be sufficient after Terrazas to establish intent.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 261. See notes 87-89 infra and accompanying text.
83. See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
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Due to the significant overlap between evidence of the act and
evidence of intent under the low evidentiary standard, it becomes
questionable whether factfinders are able to truly discern intent or
are engaging in a redundant exercise. 84  The strongest evidence of
intent will be outward manifestations of intent, and foremost
among these is expatriating conduct. 85 Typically, the citizen con-
fronting the expatriating conduct as evidence of intent will have
difficulties in establishing the lack of intent by a preponderance of
the evidence and will thus be afforded little protection under the
preponderance standard. 86
The Terrazas Court did not sufficiently analyze the interaction
of the intent requirement and the evidentiary standard. At one
point, the Court declared that the acts listed in the INA cannot be
conclusive indicators of denationalization . 7  The Court also recog-
nized however, that the acts were listed in the INA as expatriating
conduct because they were fundamentally inconsistent with United
States citizenship. 88 Even though the Court stated that an infer-
ence of assent was not always the same thing as the person's true
intent, it disregarded the difficulty in distinguishing assent from
intent under the low evidentiary standard. Thus, the mere volun-
tary commission of an expatriating act may still establish denation-
84. But see 444 U.S. at 265.
85. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
86. Consider Terrazas who signed the Mexican nationality certificate in order to fulfill a
school requirement. The certificate expressly renounced all non-Mexican nationalities, but
Terrazas testified that he did not intend to affect his United States citizenship by signing the
certificate. Nonetheless, he was expatriated because the State Department found that the
certificate was a manifestation of intent to expatriate. External factors also could have
affected that determination. The advantages of Mexican citizenship during the United States
draft for service in Vietnam would be a difficult problem for Terrazas to overcome on the
issue of intent under the preponderance standard. Defendants are also confronted with the
designation of certain conduct as expatriating. The finding that a person engaged in expatri-
ating conduct, because of its label, may prejudice any case involving the loss of nationality.
Again consider Terrazas' situation. Although there were several possible explanations for his
signing of the Mexican nationality certificate, and although he was a Mexican citizen from
birth, the conduct would be called expatriating once demonstrated by the government. Such
labelling may severely hurt dual nationals whose actions are consistent with their other
nationality. "Indeed, the opinion of the State Department once was 'that a person with a
dual citizenship who lives abroad in the other country claiming him as a national owes an
allegiance to it which is paramount to the allegiance he owes the United States.' " Kawakita
v. United States, 343 U.S. at 734-735 (footnote omitted),, quoted in 444 U.S. at 276. See note
51 supra.
87. 444 U.S. at 261.
88. See, id. at 260-61.
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alization because factfinders could, and likely would, find the in-
ference of assent emanating from the expatriating conduct
sufficient to show intent to expatriate by a preponderance of the
evidence.8
C. Citizenship Warrants a Higher Evidentiary
Standard Than Mere Preponderance
United States citizenship will not necessarily be preserved in
borderline situations.90 This Comment proposes that United States
citizenship should be preserved under such circumstances because
of its value. 9' United States citizenship has been described as the
"right to have rights, . . . the most priceless possession .... "92 The
Afroyim Court declared that citizenship was so valuable that Con-
gress could not " 'abridge,' 'affect,' 'restrict the effect of,' or 'take
[it] away.' ,,93 The Afroyim Court labelled citizenship a constitu-
tionally protected right "with the principles of liberty and equal
justice to all that the entire Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to
guarantee. 94
Citizenship has high value to both individuals and society in
general. Chief Justice Warren outlined exactly what the loss of
United States citizenship entails for the individual when he stated:
[T]he expatriate has lost the right to have rights. This pun-
ishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Consti-
tution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increas-
ing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be
established against him, what proscriptions may be directed
against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his
native land may be terminated. He may be subject to banish-
ment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is state-
less, a condition deplored in the international community of
democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous
consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a
stateless person. The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.95
89. See note 32 supra.
90. See, e.g., 444 U.S. at 272 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. See note 93 infra and accompanying text.
92. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
93. 387 U.S. at 267, quoted in 444 U.S. at 275 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. 387 U.S. at 267.
95. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted),
quoted in 444 U.S. at 271 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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As a practical matter, a person losing United States citizenship
becomes an alien. 6  As an alien the person cannot vote,97 hold
elective office,98 hold government jobs involving discretionary deci-
sion-making"9 or be employed as a teacher'00 or police officer.' 10
Aliens are prohibited from tugging United States vessels in United
States waters, 02 participating in intracoastal shipping, 0 3 being li-
censed to operate a radio station, 0 4 being a customs house bro-
ker, 10 5 and holding a regular commission in the United States
armed forces. 0 6 In addition, if the person were to have the great
misfortune not to be a dual national, he or she would become a
person without a country. 0 7
Moreover, United States citizens have collective interests in the
continued protection and high value of citizenship because citizen-
ship is an embodiment of the freedoms, rights and privileges a
society enjoys. 0 8 The protection afforded citizenship is a measure
of how highly those rights are valued. Any threat to citizenship,
including government-initiated expatriation proceedings, decreases
the value of citizenship to all individuals.
Society's involvement in a given proceeding is reflected by the
level of proof necessary for a factfinder to make a decision. 0 9 The
96. For a comparison of the rights of citizens and those of aliens see an unpublished
paper by D. Viada on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office.
97. U.S. CoNsT., amend. XIV, § 2.
98. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
99. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
100. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
101. 435 U.S. 29, (1978).
102. 46 U.S.C. § 316 (1976).
103. 46 U.S.C. §§ 808, 883 (1976).
104. 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1976).
105. 19 U.S.C. § 1641 (1976).
106. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3285, 5571, 8285 (1976).
107. See generally note 94 supra and accompanying text.
108. Citizenship was not an important concept in the Constitution, but it has evolved in
importance in respect to several fundamental rights including the voting franchise. At the
time the Constitution was adopted, voting rights were the subject of state citizenship and
were based upon landownership, sex, race and age. Such limited distribution of the franchise
proved unworkable and gradually barriers were removed, except for age, so that citizenship
is largely equated with the right to vote. When confronting the modern concept of citizenship
as a constitutional right one must consider the evolving importance of citizenship rather than
its early parameters. For varied discussions of the modern constitutional concept of citizen-
ship, see generally, Countryman, Justice Douglas and American Citizenship, 15 GoNz. L.
REv. 957 (1980); Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1977); Kettner,
The Development oJ American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The Idea of Volitional
Allegiance, 18 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 208 (1974).
109. 444 U.S. at 272 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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evidentiary standard tells a factfinder how much confidence in the
decision is needed to satisfy the community.
Considering the societal interests in expatriation proceedings,
one can question whether they are accurately protected by an
evidentiary standard that is generally used in ordinary civil actions
involving monetary disputes among private parties where the soci-
etal interests are minimal."l 0 The possible destruction of United
States citizenship under the preponderance standard also does not
accurately reflect the value of United States citizenship.1 ' It is
difficult to accept the Court's reluctance to determine that the loss
of citizenship, a constitutional right, warrants higher evidentiary
protection than mere preponderance." 2
V. THE CLEAR, CONVINCING AND
UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE STANDARD
Use of the clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence stand-
ard would insure the effectiveness of the act plus intent test, espe-
cially the intent requirement, in preventing unconstitutional dena-
tionalization. Under the clear, convincing and unequivocal
standard, a citizen who had presented significant evidence of lack
of intent to expatriate would not face denationalization. Also, the
government could not denationalize a citizen on the basis of mar-
ginally greater evidence."13
Factfinders would more closely examine the issue of intent
than they might under the preponderance standard." 4 The clear
ahd convincing standard would resolve borderline factual situations
in favor of the preservation of United States citizenship.l1' Under
the preponderance standard, citizenship can be preserved or de-
stroyed depending upon the delicate sway of the evidentiary bal-
ance."" By favoring the preservation of United States citizenship
through mandating the use of the clear, convincing and unequivo-
cal standard, the Court would have more accurately reflected the
value of that right and the privileges and duties it embodies. " 7
110. See note 9 supra.
111. See notes 90-95 supra and accompanying text.
112. 444 U.S. at 266.
113. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
114. See generally notes 79-89 supra and accompanying text.
115. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. Consider the comments of the justices dissenting from the Terrazas ruling on the
evidentiary standard: "I cannot understand, much less accept, the Court's suggestion that
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Historically, opinions favoring the use of the clear and con-
vincing standard to protect citizenship have pointed to the enor-
mous value of United States citizenship."18 The clear and convinc-
ing standard also would well serve expatriation proceedings of a
penal character 1 9 and prevent the denial of voting and other rights
for politically motivated reasons.120  Both the practical protection
and the symbolic measure of value of citizenship are better served
by the clear and convincing standard than by mere preponder-
ance. l2l
CONCLUSION
Despite the Terrazas Court's action to protect citizenship, the
effectiveness of the act plus intent test is undermined by the use of
the preponderance standard. The intent requirement is reduced to
a meaningless evidentiary issue because intent can be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence merely from the assent inferred
from the voluntary commission of an expatriating act. Thus, the
'expatriation proceedings ...do not threaten a loss of liberty.' Ante, at 266. Recognizing
that a standard of proof ultimately 'reflects the value society places' 'on the interest at stake,'
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), I would hold that a citizen may not lose his
citizenship in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that he intended to do so." 444
U.S. at 271-72 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "The House Report
accompanying the 1961 amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952
refers to 'the dignity and the priceless value of U.S. citizenship.' H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess., 41 (1961). That characterization is consistent with this Court's repeated
appraisal of the quality of the interest at stake in this proceeding. In my judgment a person's
interest in retaining his American citizenship is surely an aspect of 'liberty' of which he
cannot be deprived without due process of law." 444 U.S. at 273-274 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
118. See notes 13, 92-95 supra and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
120. The political impact of expatriation proceedings was aptly illustrated by the repeal of
certain expatriating conduct as part of the post-Vietnam amnesty program for draft evaders
and deserters. See note 4 supra.
121. To establish the clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence burden of proof, the
preponderance standard must first be abolished. If the Supreme Court continues to uphold
the power of Congress over expatriation law, then the burden is upon Congress to recognize
both the current state of the law and the lack of protection currently afforded citizenship.
Congress should codify the act plus intent test set forth by the Court in Terrazas and mandate
the use of the clear and convincing standard in all loss of nationality actions.
The same result coud be obtained if the Court were willing to find Congress without
absolute power to legislate in this area. The Court could then apply the clear and convincing
standard in all loss of nationality cases for all evidentiary issues much as it did in Nishikawa
some thirty years ago. The Court could avoid a sweeping rejection of congressional power by
leaving the preponderance standard intact for the showing of expatriating conduct but
requiring the clear and convincing standard for demonstrating the intent to expatriate.
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expatriating conduct prescribed by Congress may still establish a
loss of nationality. In order to make intent a meaningful, indepen-
dent evidentiary issue, the clear, convincing and unequivocal evi-
dence standard should be used. Citizenship is a constitutional right
which warrants the full protection of the act plus intent test and the
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence standard in expatria-
tion proceedings.
Robert Elliot Fuller

